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THE CALIFORNIA CITY versus PREEMPTION
BY IMPLICATION
By jmvms E. A=rN, JR. and LAUBmECE K. SAWYER*
CALIFORNIA cities, desiring to regulate local matters, are con-
fronted with a number of recent preemption decisions wbich both
restrict their power to regulate and offer little guidance as to which
subjects they may properly regulate. Consequently, the applica-
tion of the doctrine of preemption by the California courts has been
criticized by local officials, who contend that, as a result of these
cases, much of their local law is of questionable validity1 One city
attorney has pointed out that uncertainty in the law not only hampers
enforcement officers, administrators, attorneys, and judges, but also
confuses most of the public who no longer know how much of their
conduct is regulated by local laws.2
The factors responsible for most of this criticism include the ju-
dicially-introduced doctrine of preemption by implication and the
seemingly inconsistent treatment of the doctrine in the two recent
cases of In re Lane3 and In re Hubbard.4 The response to the problem
has taken the form of proposed statutes and constitutional amend-
ments which are intended to set out preemption guidelines for the
court and to restore apparently lost regulatory power to the cities. In
order to evaluate the proposed solutions, one must first acquire an
understanding of preemption and its purpose.
BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The basis for that part of the doctrine of preemption which is the
subject of this comment is found in section 11 of article XI of the
*Members, Second Year Class.
1 Address by Long Beach City Attorney Leonard Putnam, City Attorneys' Depart-
ment, Spring Conference, League of California Cities (1964); accord, Hearings Before
the California Senate Fact Finding Committee on Local Government on State Pre-
emption of Local Regulatory Authority (1964); Addresses by Inglewood City Attorney
Mark Allen, Los Angeles City Attorney Roger Arnebergh, and Eureka City Attorney
Melvin S. Johnsen, City Attorneys' Department, Spring Conference, League of California
Cities (1963); Address by Modesto City Attorney Allen Grimes, City Attorneys'
Department, Spring Conference, League of California Cities (1962). These Addresses
are on file at the Office of the League of California Cities, Berkeley, Cal.
2 Address by Long Beach City Attorney Leonard Putnam, supra note 1.
3 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
4 62 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964).
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Califorma constitution. 5 This section provides; "Any county, city,
town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such
local, police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws." When this provision was written into the consti-
tution in 1879, it was unique, and the Califorma courts had to in-
terpret the section "unaided by anything that went before." For a
short time after 1879 the section was considered a charter in itself,
but since then, it has been limited to the power to make and enforce
"rules of conduct to be observed by citizens."" Whe section 11 in-
volves a broad grant of home rule, it also contains the limitation that
regulations enacted by the municipalities are not to "conflict with
general laws."9 The scope of this limitation is the problem involved
in a preemption case.
In determining the limitation on municipal power, the courts must
decide what is meant by "conflict with general laws." Generally, the
courts have followed three guidelines in recogmzmg the existence
of a conflict between State law and a municipal ordinance. First, the
courts will find a conflict when there is express conflict. This occurs
when the legislature expressly provides that there shall be no local
5 This comment is not concerned with a discussion of the concept munictpal affairs,
CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8, but it should be mentioned here that certain problems arise
when the courts overlap CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 8 with CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 11
in a preemption case. See note 52 rnfra.
The Califorma supreme court has said:
The doctrine of state preemption becomes a determining factor only when a
political subdivision (not necessarily a chartered city) attempts to legislate
under its admitted police power (art. X, § 11) on a subject that the state
also has legislated upon. The question then arises as to whether the subject
matter of the legislation has not been preempted by the state. The doctrine is
not applicable to the claim that the state Legislature is prohibited (by the
home rule provisions of the other sections of art. XI) from enacting legislation
which will affect a chartered city. In the latter case, the sole question is whether
or not the subject matter of the attempted legislation is exclusively a municipal
affair.
Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292 n.11, 32
Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 n.11, 384 P.2d 158, 168 n.11 (1963). For a discussion of the nature
of the municipal affairs concept, see Note, 16 HAsTI GS L.J. 265 (1964). For an ex-
ample and discussion of the kind of dilemma the munimcpal affairs concept can pose
see Note, 17 HAsTmnos L.J. 635 (1966).
6 Peppin, Munztpal Home Rule rn Californta, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 342 (1944).
7 Ex parte Campbell, 74 Cal. 20, 26, 15 Pac. 318, 321 (1887).
8Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 161, 38 Pac. 682, 686 (1894) (city's
power to purchase land not derived from CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11); cf. Merced County
v. Helm, 102 Cal. 159, 36 Pac. 399 (1894) (revenue ordinance not enacted under power
derived from CAL. CoNsT. art XI, § 11).
9 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 681, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163, 349
P.2d 974, 979 (1960); In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 148, 14 Pac. 405, 408 (1887); Agnew
v. City of Los Angeles, 110 Cal. App. 2d 612, 615,243 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1952).
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regulation on a particular subject ° or when a statute prohibits what
an ordinance authorizes and vice versa." Secondly, a conflict arises
when a mumcipal ordinance duplicates State law, i.e. when the or-
dinance regulates the same act which is regulated by the State.'2 In
In re Sic, the court pointed out that if a conflict did not exist when
an ordinance duplicates State law, a defendant would be exposed
to double jeopardy' 3 Finally, the courts will recognize a conflict
when a municipality imposes additional regulation in a field which
is fully occupied by the State.'4 Twenty-two years ago, when this
elusive guideline was an infant m the mind of the court, Professor
Peppin asked: "How far may cities or counties make and enforce
police regulations in a field in which the legislature has already made
extensive regulation of its own?"' 5 His answer then was that, m spite
of comprehensive regulation by the State, the courts were reluctant
to hold that the legislature had occupied the field and to condemn
on that ground additional mumncipal ordinances which did not di-
rectly conflict with State law '6 Since that time this guideline has
been greatly modified. And, today, anyone who is familiar with In re
Lane'7 knows that this reluctance on the part of the court is an atti-
tude of the past.
The guideline of full occupation requires separate analysis m order
to give it meaning. This analysis involves the discussion of two ques-
tions. First, what kind of additional or supplementary regulation is
allowed? In certain cases where the legislature has not fully occupied
the field, additional or supplementary regulation is permitted. 8 Some
10 In re Murphy, 190 Cal. 286, 212 Pac. 30 (1923); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal.
636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920). Cf. City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 A.C. 95, 48 Cal. Rptr. 889,
410 P.2d 393 (1966).
11In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 250 Pac. 681 (1926); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal.
636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); People v. Commons, 64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 929-30, 148
P.2d 724, 727 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1944) (dictum).
12 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942); In re Sic,
73 Cal. 142, 148, 14 Pac. 405, 408 (1887); People v. Papayams, 101 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
918, 921-22, 226 P.2d 91, 94-95 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1950).
13 In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 148, 14 Pac. 405, 408 (1887).
14 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 102, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859, 372 P.2d 897, 899
(1962); Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 282 (1952); Pipoly v.
Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 370, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (1942) (dictum).
15 Peppin, supra note 6, at 382.
16 lId. at 387-88.
1758 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962). See text accompanying
notes 35-39 infra.
I8 1n re Portney, 21 Cal. 2d 237, 131 P.2d 1 (1942); In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582,
250 Pae. 681 (1926); Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919); In re
Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909); Gleason v. Municipal Court, 226 Cal.
App. 2d 584, 38 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1964).
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courts have said, however, that an additional regulation must not
only be reasonable but it must be appropriate to the needs of a par-
ticular locality 9 Furthermore, it has been held that the additional
regulation must be "in aid and furtherance of the purpose of the
general law " 20 In any event, while stricter conditions might be im-
posed by the mumcipality, regulations which are less stringent than
the State law are in conflict therewith.21
A second question involves the meaning of full occupation of the
field. In Tolman v. Underhill,2 2 the court said:
Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular
subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the
exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by the
language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legis-
lative scheme.28
The California courts have generally used this measure of "legislative
scheme."24 The legislature need not declare a scheme in so many
words,25 and whether a particular legislative scheme indicates an
intention fully to occupy a field depends upon a number of factors:
"Whether a particular statute or group of statutes is sufficiently com-
prehensive to show an intent to occupy the entire field is a matter
which cannot properly be decided upon the basis of any single pre-
cise test."2 One factor considered is the detail of the legislation. In
some cases courts have said that detailed State regulation indicates
an intent fully to occupy the field;27 in other cases courts have said
19 Natural Milk Producers Ass'n v. City & County of San Francisco, 20 Cal. 2d
101, 124 P.2d 25 (1942); In re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909).
20 Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 176, 339 P.2d 801, 809 (1959); accord, In re
Hubbard, 62 Cal. 2d 119, 124, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396, 396 P.2d 809, 812 (1964); In re
Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 586, 250 Pac. 681, 682 (1926); Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550,
556, 182 Pac. 281, 283-84 (1919).
21 In re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 118, 99 Pac. 517, 519 (1909).
22 39 Cal. 2d 708, 249 P.2d 280 (1952).
28 Id. at 712, 249 P.2d at 283. (Emphasis added.)
24 In re Zorn, 59 Cal. 2d 650, 651, 30 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812, 381 P.2d 635, 636
(1963); Whitney v. Mumoipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 909, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18, 377
P.2d 80, 82 (1962); In re Moss, 58 Cal. 2d 117, 118, 23 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362, 373 P.2d
425, 426 (1962); In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 102-03, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859, 372 P.2d
897, 899 (1962); Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 684, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158,
164, 349 P.2d 974, 981 (1960); People v. DeYoung, 228 Cal. App. 2d 331, 334, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 487, 488 (1964); People v. Jenkins, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 905-06, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 410, 411 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1962).
25 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 167, 349
P.2d 974, 981-82 (1960).
26 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 110, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 863, 372 P.2d 897, 903 (1962)
(concurrng opinion).
27 Chavez v. Sergent, 52 Cal. 2d 162, 177, 339 P.2d 801, 810 (1959); Wilson v.
Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 860, 306 P.2d 789, 794 (1957); Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d
708, 713, 249 P.2d 280, 283 (1952).
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that the mere fact that State law contains detail does not of itself
establish such an intent.2 8 Quantity of legislation is also an apparent
consideration.29 It has been said, however, that the legislative intent
can be evidenced either by a multiplicity of statutes or a single enact-
ment.30 Also, there has been criticism when a preemption decision
is apparently based solely on quantity3 l After the court has found
sufficient comprehensiveness in a legislative scheme to constitute full
occupation, it will hold that by inference3 2 or by implication 3 the
legislature intended to preempt the field. This doctrine of preemption
by implication, whereby the court invalidates a supplementary local
regulation, has introduced much of the uncertainty into the law of
preemption.
THE PUZZLE OF LANE AND HUBBARD
It is apparent 'from this brief discussion of preemption by full
occupation of the field that there are few fixed concepts which guide
the court in reaching a conclusion. On the contrary, it would appear
that each case is determined on the basis of the subject matter in-
volved and the needs of present-day society,84 which may lead to an
apparent conflict between successive decisions. No better example can
be put forward than the two recent cases of Lane 5 and Hubbard.8 In
both cases the State legislation was silent in regard to the specific act
which the municipality outlawed, and yet the supreme court appar-
ently reached opposite conclusions. In 1962 Carol Lane was convicted
of violating a Los Angeles ordinance which prohibited "resorting" (e.g.
to any residence, apartment house, hotel, etc.) for the purpose of hav-
ing sexual intercourse.3 7 The supreme court examined the Penal Code
sections covering criminal aspects of sexual activity and concluded
28People v. Jenkins, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 906-07, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412
(App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1962); Daniel v. Board of Police Commissioners,
190 Cal. App. 2d 566, 570, 12 Cal. Bptr. 226, 229 (1961); People v. Commons, 64 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 925, 931, 148 P.2d 724, 728 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1944).
29Tn re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 103, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 859-60, 372 P.2d 897, 899
(1962).
3
0 In re Martin, 221 Cal. App. 2d 14, 17, 34 Cal. Rptr. 299, 301 (1963).
31See Note, In re Lane, 50 CM n. L. REv, 740 (1962); Comment, The State and
the City, 36 So. CAr.. L. REv. 430 (1963).
82 Abbott v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. 2d 674, 685, 3 Cal. lptr. 158, 165-66,
349 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1960).
3
3 1n re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 104, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 860, 372 P.2d 897, 900
(1962).
84See generally In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 111, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 864, 372 P.2d
897, 904 (1962) (concurring opinion); Note, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 440, 446 (1963).
35 Supra note 34.
386 2 Cal. 2d 119, 41 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809 (1964).
87 Los AnGmLs, CAL., MumcA.L CoDE: § 41.07 (1955).
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that they were so extensive in their scope that there was clearly
an intention by the legislature to adopt a general scheme for the
regulation of the subject.8 8 Because mere forication was not out-
lawed by the Penal Code, the court said that by implication the
legislature had decided not to make such conduct criminal in the
State.39 Therefore, the court held, the resorting ordinance was in
conflict with general law 40 Two years later Horace Hubbard was
convicted of playing the game of pangumgul in violation of the
Long Beach Muicipal Code which outlaws the playing of games
of chance.41 The supreme court recognized the extensive scope of the
Penal Code sections dealing with gambling but concluded that "they
were far from being all inclusive."42 The court held that since the
Penal Code enumerated specific games, 43 the legislature had only
partly occupied the field44 and did not intend to prevent local au-
thority from regulating those subjects in regard to which the Penal
Code was silent.45 The Hubbard court apparently rejected the con-
cept of preemption by implication, the basis of the Lane decision. In
Hubbard, Justice Peters said.
Since the general laws do not make illegal all forms of gambling,
or even all forms of gaming, they cannot be said to occupy either
field to the exclusion of the exercise of local police power, unless
we adopt the negative type of argument that by making specific
acts illegal the Legislature intended all other acts of similar charac-
ter to be of such innocent character that no local authority might
adopt a contrary view46
This "negative type of argument," however, appears to constitute the
reasoning behind the Lane decision. How, then, can Lane and Hub-
bard be reconciled?
It would seem that the cases can be reconciled upon a principle
stated in Mann v. Scott.4 7 In that case the court said:
The question whether the legislature has undertaken to occupy
exclusively a given field of legislation is, we thnk, to be determined
in every case upon an analysis of the statute and of the facts and
circumstances upon which it was intended to operate.48
38 58 Cal. 2d at 103, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 372 P.2d at 899.
39 58 Cal. 2d at 104, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 860, 372 P.2d at 900.
40 58 Cal. 2d at 105, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 860, 372 P.2d at 900.
41 LONG BEACH, CAL., MuNIcIPAL CODE § 4140.7 (1955).
42 62 Cal. 2d at 125, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 396 P.2d at 813.
43 CAL. PEN. CODE § 330.
44 62 Cal. 2d at 125-26, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 397, 396 P.2d at 813.
45 62 Cal. 2d at 127, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 396 P.2d at 814.
46 62 Cal. 2d at 126, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 398, 396 P.2d at 814.
47 180 Cal. 550, 182 Pac. 281 (1919).
48 Id. at 557-58, 182 Pac. at 284. (Emphasis added.)
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This analysis of the facts and circumstances is a well-recognized
proposition in the preemption cases,4 9 and apparently includes a con-
sideration of the relevant policy factors involved.
Both Lane and Hubbard discuss relevant policy considerations,
and when the particular subject matter of each case is applied to the
policy factors discussed, the cases can be reconciled. In Lane, the
subject matter was sexual activity, and Chief Justice Gibson, in his
concurring opinion, spoke of the need for uniform treatment through-
out the State because of the development of numerous cities within
a continuous urban community 5 0 He concluded by saying: "The sub-
ject is not one affecting only an isolated group of citizens but is one
involving the concerns of people generally, and it should be legis-
lated upon accordingly""' In Hubbard, the subject matter was gamn-
bling, and Justice Peters concluded that the subject was properly
regulated by the municipality as a municipal affair 5 2 In other words,
he rejected the contention that gambling was exclusively a matter of
statewide concern because (1) the subject had not been completely
covered by State law, (2) there was nothing in the general law in-
dicating a State concern regarding the regulation of games not ex-
pressly prohibited, and (3) the regulation of gambling establishments
was not a matter in which transient citizens were peculiarly con-
cerned.53 From this comparison it would seem that when the court
analyzes the facts and circumstances upon which a statute is in-
tended to operate, it will balance the special needs of a particular
locality against the need for uniform State treatment in order to
reach a proper result from a policy standpoint.54
If Lane and Hubbard are to be reconciled, the question is whether
Hubbard rejected the Lane doctrine of preemption by implication.
Chief Justice Gibson anticipated this question in Lane when he said:
49 Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 283 (1952); Eastlick v.
City of Los Angeles, 29 Ca. 2d 661, 666, 177 P.2d 558, 562 (1947); In re Iverson, 199
Cal. 582, 586-87, 250 Fae. 681, 682 (1926); In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 110, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 857, 863, 372 P.2d 897, 903 (1962) (concurring opinion).
50 58 Cal. 2d at 111, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 372 P.2d at 904 (1962).
51 Ibid.
5262 Cal. 2d at 128, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 396 P.2d at 815 (1964). There are
problems which arise when the courts overlap CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, §§ 6, 8 with CAL.
CONST. art. XI, § 11 in a preemption case. Since only chartered cities are allowed "to
make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs," CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 6, while all cities "may make and enforce regulations as are not in
conflict with general laws," CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11, Hubbard raises the question
whether the State has preempted the field of gambling, as discussed in the case, in
regard to cities other than chartered cities.
53 62 Cal. 2d at 128, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 396 P.2d at 815. Perhaps this last clause
discussed by Justice Peters is the real distinction between the field of sexual activity
and the field of gambling.
54 See also Note, 50 CAUFw. L. REv. 740, 743 (1962).
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[W]hether the state has fully occupied the field with respect to any
given subject depends upon considerations which will necessarily
vary and must therefore be determined in every case without pre-judging the result as to subjects not before the court. . [W]e
should not attempt to determine here whether gambling is a proper
subject for local regulation 55
The Hubbard court did not reject the doctrine of preemption by i-
plication, but rather it merely said that in the field of gambling the
legislative silence did not indicate an intent to preempt, and thus pre-
emption by nplication did not apply
In Lane, however, Chief Justice Gibson also said that "a com-
prehensive and detailed general plan or scheme with respect to a
subject serves, without more, to occupy the field . .,"56 As a practical
test, consideration restricted only to the subject matter of a given
statute, without more, offers little guidance for reasonable prediction
in preemption cases. The concept of subject has received widely
varying treatment in the courts. It has been described m sweeping
terms as the criminal aspects of sexual activity based on sixty Penal
Code sections.5 7 At the other extreme, subject has been narrowly
limited to the crimnal aspects of intoxication in a place open to the
public view, based on only one subsection of the Penal Code."' Obvi-
ously, the court has wide discretion in determining the extent of the
general law necessary to comprise a legislative scheme with respect to
a subject so that it can conclude that by implication the subject has
been preempted. For a more meaningful comprehension of preemp-
tion by implication, the attempt will be made to demonstrate that
the relative concepts of legislative scheme and subject cannot be
evaluated apart from the various policy factors which influence the
court.
PREEMPTION BY IMPLICATION
The court apparently applies a process of balancing a variety of
policy factors, weighing each with due regard to the facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case. For example, special consideration
to local needs may be given where the ordinance is intended to solve
a particular local problem.59 An illustration is found in People v. len-
55 58 Cal. 2d at 110 & n.2, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864 & n.2, 372 P.2d at 904 & n.2 (1962)
(concurring opinion). (Emphasis added.)
56 Id. at 109, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 863, 372 P.2d at 903. (Emphasis added.)
57 Id. at 103-04, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 372 P.2d at 899.
58 People v. Lopez, 59 Cal. 2d 653, 653-54, 30 Cal. Rptr. 813, 813-14, 381 P.2d
637, 637-38 (1963).
59 1n re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 Pac. 517 (1909); Gleason v. Municipal Court,
226 Cal. App. 2d 584, 38 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1964); People v. Jenkins, 207 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 904, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410 (App. Deit Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1962); People v.
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kzns60 where the ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to have
in Ins possession, in any automobile any dangerous or deadly weap-
on."61 Riding in the back seat with a loaded revolver concealed
under the floor of the car, the defendant was not in violation of State
law,62 as the gun was not concealed on his person nor was the vehicle
under Is control. Upholding the ordinance as necessary for a special
local situation, the court concluded:
Los Angeles is a densely populated municipality The danger from
gunmen m a large city is far greater than in a sparsely settled rural
area and is a more frequent occurrence.. It is unthinkable that
the Legislature intended to deny the public in Los Angeles the
protection which the ordinance gives.63
On the other hand, an ordinance is disfavored to the extent that
it attaches special regulations to a subject that is best regulated by
a uniform State standard. An obvious example is found in Lane,
where the criminal aspects of sexual activity comprised such a sub-
ject. The concurring opinion noted:
The subject under consideration here requires uniform treatment
throughout the state. Modem methods of transportation have led
people to travel from one location to another more frequently than
in the past. Under these circumstances much unnecessary con-
fusion and uncertainty would result if each locality were to enforce
different rules with respect to the subject involved here.64
Another factor the court seems to consider is the serious problem
raised concerning local law enforcement and civil liberties. Because
the legislature in a comprehensive scheme failed to mention a par-
ticular act, the court has held that not only has the legislature itself
not prohibited the act, but it has also taken away the power of the
city to forbid it.65 This effect of preemption by implication has been
Commons, 64 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 925, 148 P.2d 724 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles,
1944).6o Supra note 59.
61Los ANGEEs, CAL., MUNIcIPAL CODE, § 55.05(e) (1955).
62 CAL. PEN. CODE § 12025, which prohibits carrying weapon concealed on one's
person or concealed within a vehicle under one's control.
63People v. Jenkins, 207 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 904, 907, 24 Cal. Rptr. 410, 412
(App. Dep't Super. Ct Los Angeles, 1962). Compare People v. Bass, 225 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 777, 33 Cal. Rptr. 365 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1963). Less than
one year later, the same court that decided Jenkins held that the ordinance making it
unlawful to carry a concealed knife with a blade three inches or more in length was
invalid. The field was found preempted by the Dangerous Weapons Control Act, CAL.
PEN. CODE §§ 12000-12094, the same legislation which did not preempt the field n
Jenkins.
6458 Cal. 2d at 111, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 864, 372 P.2d at 904 (1962) (concurring
opinion).
65People v. Bass, 225 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 777, 782, 33 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 1963).
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criticized as imposing an unnecessary stumbling block in the path of
local police efforts.66
Although preemption may make the task of local law enforcement
more difficult, the result might be explained on the ground that the
ordinances invalidated tended to restrict individual liberties with un-
necessary harshness. Indeed, in Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,67 one
of the earliest cases where the court applied preemption by implica-
tion, the court avoided passing on the contention that the ordinance
was unreasonable and deprived the defendant of due process of law
by holding that general law impliedly preempted the field. 8 The
same tendency is apparent in People v. Cole,9 where the ordinance
prohibited possession of a lottery ticket. In holding that the suppres-
sion of lotteries is a field preempted by State law, the court cited
seven Penal Code sections 0 wich provided penalties for one who
actively participates in holding a lottery, rather than the individual
who comes into possession of a single ticket.71 In the intoxication
66 Address by Long Beach City Attorney Leonard Putnam: "State Preemption-Past
and Future," City Attorneys' Department, Spring Conference, League of California
Cities (1964), on file at office of League of California Cities, Berkeley, Cal. Los Angeles
County Supervisor Warren Dom contends that the Lane case is "the most destructive
single case ever banded down in California, and has done more to deteriorate local
law enforcement practices than anything else." San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1965,
p. 6, col. 2. For Mr. Dorn's response to this aspect of the preemption problem see note
93 infra and accompanying text.
67 53 Cal. 2d 674, 3 Cal. Rptr. 158, 349 P. 2d 974 (1960).
68 53 Cal. 2d at 689, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 168, 349 P.2d at 984. See also Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). Quaere: Would much of the preemption problem have
been avoided, at least in the regulatory field, had the court decided Abbott and subse-
quent preemption cases squarely on the constitutional ground of denial of due process,
i.e., lack of notice to the defendant so that there is no "wilfulness" in the violation? Gen-
erally, the court will avoid decision on a constitutional question where there are
adequate alternative grounds, because a premature and unnecessary constitutional
ruling might have widespread and unpredictable results, "rendering rights uncertain
and insecure." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
But has preemption as a basis of decision rendered rights any less uncertain than would
the constitutional basis of decision?
69 226 Cal. App. 2d 125, 37 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1964).
70 The following sections of the California Penal Code were held to comprise a
comprehensive scheme for the suppression of lotteries: § 320 (setting up or drawing a
lottery); § 321 (sale of chances); § 322 (aiding or assisting in a lottery); § 323 (keep-
ing or advertising lottery offices); § 324 (insuring lottery tickets); § 325 (forfeiture of
money or property offered for lottery); and § 326 (letting or permitting use of any
building or vessel for lottery purposes).
71 Similar ordinances outlawing passive conduct were invalidated through pre-
emption by implication in In re Loretizo, 59 Cal. 2d 445, 30 Cal. Rptr. 16, 380 P.2d
656 (1963) (ordinance prohibiting possession of wagering material; state law applies to
one who makes or receives bets) and People v. Franks, 226 Cal. App. 2d 123, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 800 (1965) (ordinance prohibiting visiting a gambling house; state law provides
punishment for one who prevails upon another to visit a gambling house, but does not
forbid mere attendance there).
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cases, 72 the defendants were cited under ordinances prohibiting drunk-
enness in a place open to public view, including private premises.
State law, fully occupying the field, provided penalties for one "found
in any public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor in
such condition he is unable to exercise care for his own safety, or
the safetfof others, or interferes with the free use of any
street "73 In People v. DeYoung74 the ordinance prohibited drunk-
enness on private premises to the annoyance of any other person.
Finding the field preempted, the court did not discuss the question
whether the subjective state of mind of another person is a constitu-
tionally valid test of criminal guilt.7.
The conflict between local efforts to facilitate law enforcement
and the court's disfavor of ordinances unduly restricting individual
liberties is even more apparent in Spitcauer v. County of Los An-
geles,76 where the ordinance prohibited the operation of studios
"wherein models pose for the purpose of being sketched, painted,
photographed, or purportedly photographed by persons who pay
a fee for the right or opportunity so to depict the model or for
admission to the premises." 7 7 Admittedly a measure to control por-
nography, perversion, and prostitution, where such acts were difficult
to prove, the ordinance was invalidated as an additional proscription
in the area of the criminal aspects of sexual activity, a field preempted
by general law 78 State law, the court noted, already regulated such
studios, pumshing one who procures another to take part in any
model exhibition which is adapted to excite lewd thoughts or acts,
or one who keeps houses of prostitution.79 The ordinance, requiring
no wrongful purpose, would greatly facilitate police arrests, but
at the expense of curtailing legitimate activity which may not war-
rant such interference. In view of the modem trend away from im-
posing strict liability offenses,80 the court's practice of invalidating
7 2 In re Koehne, 59 Cal. 2d 646, 30 Cal. Rptr. 809, 381 P.2d 633 (1963); People
v. Lopez, 59 Cal. 2d 653, 30 Cal. Rptr. 813, 381 P.2d 637 (1963); In re Zorn, 59 Cal. 2d
650, 30 Cal. Rptr. 811, 381 P.2d 635 (1963).
7 3 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f).
74228 Cal. App. 2d 331, 39 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1964).
75 Even though the parties did not raise this question, the lower appellate court
mentioned the possibility that such subjective standard of guilt might be unconstitutional.
However, the court did not undertake to decide the issue once the field was found pre-
empted by State law. People v. DeYoung, 226 A.C.A. 421, 39 Cal. Rptr. 598 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. Santa Barbara, 1964).
76227 Cal. App. 2d 376, 38 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1964).
77 Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance No. 8253, § 8.
78 In re Lane, 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal. Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962).
79 CAL. PENr. CODE §§ 314(2), 315-16.
80 See Perkins, Alignment of Sanction with Culpable Conduct, 49 IowA L. RBv.
325 (1964).
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ordinances which require less evidence of a wrongful motive may be
the basis of the preemption doctnne in the regulatory field. Still, in
the other direction, the court recognizes the situation where the need
for public safety outweighs any need to protect individual liberties.
In Gleason v. Municipal Courts' the ordinance prohibiting loitering
in any tunnel or pedestrian subway82 was properly held to supple-
ment State law which prohibited loitering in other instances.8 3 The
court concluded that the ordinance dealt with a problem not common
to the State generally, but peculiar to urban areas where pedestrian
tunnels are provided for school children and others in need of the
ordinance's protection.84
Basically, then, it would seem that according to the various policy
factors, the court will balance the peculiar needs of the municipality
against the general beneflits of uniform statewide treatment. When
faced with the propriety of a municipal ordinance on a subject not
expressly covered by State law, the court will determine the relative
merits of a geographically limited regulation, weighing benefits to
the mumcipality against any adverse effect on the citizenry as a
whole. Also taken into account in the balancing process are the in-
tangible factors of individual liberties, law enforcement, and public
safety
RESPONSE TO THE PREEMPTION PROBLEM: STATUTES
AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
The apparently uncertain nature of preemption by implication, as
well as opposition to its effect on the scope of local regulatory power,
has stimulated various efforts for some type of clarifying enactment.
Statutes and constitutional amendments were proposed without suc-
cess in the 1963 .and 1965 general sessions of the State legislature.
The statutory approach has included bills which may be classified
as "general grant of permission," "code construction," and "specific
subject" types. The "general grant of permission" statutes would pro-
vide that no legislative scheme shall be construed to interfere with
local regulations on the same or related subject, unless there is direct
grammatical conflict or express prohibition of further local enact-
ments.85 The expectation would be to confer general authority on the
81226 Cal. App. 2d 584, 38 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1964).
82 Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNIcIPAL CoDE § 41.18(b) (1955).
83 CAL. Pm. CODE § 647(d) (loitering about any public toilet for lewd purposes);
§ 647(e) (loitering upon the streets without apparent reason); § 647(g) (loitering on
private property); § 647a (loitering about any school).
84226 Cal. App. 2d at 587, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 229 (1964).
85 S.B. 494 (1965) would add section 9613 to the Government Code to read:
The Legislature shall not be deemed to have intended to preempt any field of
legislation, thereby making invalid any local ordinance in such field, unless
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muicipality to regulate an activity free from judicial application of
the preemption by implication doctrine. The "code construction" bills
make similar provisions for construing the effect of specific State
codes on local ordinances.8" Finally, the "specific subject" proposals
would declare that it is not the intent of the legislature to preempt
a particular subject (e.g., gambling) covered or touched upon byState statutesY7
The purpose of the statutory approach is to provide the court with
rules of interpretation for the concept "conflict with general law" 8
Assuming no duplication or grammatical conflict, the practical result
would be that there must be express legislative foreclosure of further
local regulation before the court could apply the preemption doc-
trne. Yet this conclusion may be questioned by an analysis of the
constitutional concept of "conflict with general law" A mere prohibi-
tion by the legislature of local regulation in a specified field, without
the legislature itself occupying the field with affirmative provisions,
would be in violation of express constitutional authority granted to
the municipality to enact local regulations. 9 As "conflict with gen-
eral law" is determined by the affirmative provisions of general law,
it would seem that a general grant of permission, or even a limited
pernssion applymg only to one State code, to enact local regulations
would be equally ineffective against a judicial finding that the legis-
lature had in fact fully occupied the field with affirmative regula-
tions. These statutes would be only one factor the court might con-
sider to determine the extent of general law Clearly, by enacting
(1) there is a general scheme of state legislation in such field and (2) legisla-
tion expressly provides that the state has preempted such field or expressly
prohibits other and further regulation n such field.
Other similar proposals in the 1965 general session of the California Legislature were
S.B. 469 and S.B. 642, and the more detailed A.B. 23.
86 E.g., S.B. 346, relating to construction of the Penal Code. The opposite alterna-
tive for code construction enactments is illustrated by CAL. VEHIcLE CODE: § 21.
Uniformity of Code. Except as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions
of this Code are applicable and uniform throughout the State and mn all counties
and municipalities therein, and no local authority shall enact or enforce any
ordinance on the matters covered by this Code unless expressly authorized
herem.
87E.g., A.B. 6 (1965), A.B. 49 (1965) and A.B. 1172 (1965) (gaming), A.B. 1254
(1965) (sexual activity and gambling), A.B. 48 (1965) (Intoxication in public or private
places), A.B. 1884 (1965) (obscene matter), A.B. 3319 (1965) (political activities of
public employees), S.B. 614 (1965) (loitering or otherwise being on the street at night),
S.B. 827 (1965) (advertising displays within view of public highways), and S.B. 1053
(1965) (water districts). A.B. 3319 (1965), by contrast, declares a legislative intent to
preempt the subject of political activities of public employees.8 8 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
S9 Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942); Ex parte Danels, 183
Cal. 636, 192 Pac. 442 (1920); Wallace v. Regents of University of Califorma, 75 Cal.
App. 274, 242 Pac. 872 (1926).
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these statutes the legislature could not perform the court's function
of interpreting the laws 0
The constitutional approach has been an attempt to expand
article XI, section 11 of the Califoria constitution to fiurmsh a consti-
tutional definition of "conflict with general law" Constitutional re-
quirements for a finding of "conflict" would be (1) duplication, (2)
grammatical conflict, or (3) a comprehensive scheme which expressly
precludes further local regulation.91 The immediate effect would be
to abrogate the doctrine of premption by implication in California
law In other words, the court would be constitutionally required to
focus its attention only on express provisions in the statutes, ignoring
relevant policy considerations. Indeed, there would ensue a process
of "preemption m reverse" whereby the court would be precluded
from definig "conflict with general law," even where there was an
obvious need for uniform State regulation. In this manner, the respon-
sibility for deciding what subjects are best regulated by a uniform
standard throughout the State is squarely placed on the legislature,
which must take positive steps to preclude local regulation. As a
practical matter, however, the legislature will seldom expressly fore-
close mumcipal regulation of a subject, as it is especially difficult to
foresee matters arising in the future which may require special, local
treatment. Municipalities, on the other hand, are clothed with ex-
pansive authority, with few internal pressures to protect the interests
of transient citizens or the State itself from adverse local enact-
ments.9 2 Should lack of general law on a subject leave the field com-
pletely available for local laws, one might expect that the varying
degree of control that each city might place on the subject would
require our highly mobile population to conform to a new standard
of conduct with every crossing of a city line. By providing a legal
90 CAL. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 (separation of powers).
91A.C.A. 13, proposed in the 1965 general session of the California legislature,
would amend article XI, section 11, of the constitution to provide:
Any county, city, city and county, or town may make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict
with general laws.
Such regulations shall be in conflict with general law only in the following
cases:
1. When the regulation duplicates general law.
2. When the regulation authorizes or purports to authorize that which is
expressly prohibited by general law.
3. When the regulation prohibits or purports to prohibit that which is
expressly permitted by general law.
4. When there is a comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same sub-
ject by general law, and such general law-
(a) Expressly provides that it has occupied the entire field of such
legislation, or
(b) Expressly prohibits other and further regulation in the field of
such legislation.
92See Note, 72 HAny. L. Emv. 737, 746-47 (1958).
[Vol. 17
solution to the preemption problem (to the extent that uncertainty
would be eliminated) the amendment would seem to restrain the
court with undue harshness. A more desirable approach would permit
the discretionary balancing process reflecting the relative benefits of
local regulation and statewide uniformity
Another response to the preemption problem following the con-
stitutional approach is the proposed "decency" initiative submitted
by a Los Angeles County Supervisor.93 This proposal would have the
same constitutional effect described above, but only as to enumerated
moral offenses. Obviously a direct reaction to the Lane case, the
initiative would effectively reverse the rule of Lane regarding pre-
emption of the criminal aspects of sexual activity, but would leave
intact the basic principle of Lane: preemption by inplication. Mu-
mcipalities might again regulate the criminal aspects of sexual ac-
tivity, but by negative inference there would be constitutional ap-
proval of the doctrine of preemption by implication on all subjects
not within the narrow coverage of the initiative.9 As it appears that
the court in the preemption cases will consider the subject matter
involved in light of relevant policy factors, the mitiative, dealing
with only a few selected subjects, would seem to be a wholly in-
adequate response to the preemption problem.
CONCLUSION
Preemption by implication, as developed in the Abbott and Lane
cases, is a recent innovation in Califoria law The doctrine has not
been the basis of decision in a large number of cases, although the
relatively few cases where it has been applied have evoked much
controversy The proposed solutions, it would seem, have been framed
with reference only to the specific subjects that have reached the
93 The initiative would add section 11.5 to article XI of the Califorma constitution
as follows:
The people of the State being gravely concerned over the spread of obscenity,
prostitution, pornography, public indecent exposure, venereal disease, physical
attacks on women and children, and the lack of respect for law and order, do
hereby express their desire to restore to local governments the right to establish
and enforce local standards of decency supplemental to those set by the State,
to take more effective action to protect the health and safety of their citizenry
and to insure greater respect for law and order. This section shall be liberally
construed to effectuate this purpose.
Any regulation made pursuant to section 11 of this Article by any county,
city, city and county, or town, respecting prostitution and other criminal aspects
of sexual activity, public indecent exposure, obscenity, pornography, loitering
with respect to the protection of persons from molestation is not to be construed
to be in conflict with general laws as used in Section 11 of this Article except
as follows:
(The amendment continues with the same four instances contained in A.C.A. 13 (1965)
as set forth in note 91 supra.)
94 Letter From Richard Carpenter, Executive Director and General Counsel, League
of California Cities, to City Attorneys, August 27, 1965, on file at office at League of
California Cities, Berkeley, Cal.
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courts. For this reason it would appear that any statutory or constitu-
tional change in the law would be premature. Adequate time ought
to be allowed for the development of case law and for the completion
of committee studies of the State legislature. Indeed, one may ques-
tion whether there is any necessity for a statute or constitutional
amendment. The value of judicial discretion permitted by policy
considerations ought not to be discounted; the unlimited forms of
human conduct which a city might regulate give rise to an infinite
variety of possible preemption cases.
If any immediate enactment is required at all, a constitutional
amendment would seem most appropriate, but it would seem best
to limit the amendment to a codification of the general guidelines as
established by case law 95 In its definition of "conflict with general
law," this amendment would permit preemption by implication within
prescribed limits. In this respect, the recommended amendment sets
out two guidelines. First, regarding legislative scheme, it is not in-
tended to make quantity a test, but rather it would dissuade the
court from finding preemption by unplication in a scheme where
quantity is minimal. Second, the amendment would allow the court
to consider the need for local regulation as opposed to the need for
uniform state treatment. Although this measure would not completely
eliminate the uncertainty as to the existence of a "conflict," the need
for certainty may be outweighed by the need to reach a result har-
momous with the legitimate expectations of the majority of members
of our dynamic and mobile society
APPENDIX
Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Section 11. Any county, city, city and county, or town may make and
enforce within its limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regula-
tions as are not in conflict with general laws.
Such regulations are in conflict with general law only in the following
instances:
1. When the regulation duplicates general law.
2. When the regulation authorizes that which is expressly prohibited
by general law or prohibits that which is expressly permitted by general
law.
3. When general law expressly provides that it has occupied the en-
tire field of such regulation, or expressly prohibits other and further regu-
lation in the field of such regulation.
4. When the subject of such regulation is fully covered by general
law, and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of the local
ordinance on the transient citizens of the state, or on the citizens of the
State generally, outweighs any possible benefit to the county, city, city and
county, or town.
95 See Appendix for the constitutional amendment that the authors would propose.
